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The Asian Drivers and SSA: MFA Quota 
Removal and the Portents for African 
Industrialisation? 
Raphael Kaplinsky and Mike Morris 
Introduction 
Most debates around the industrialisation possibilities for developing countries start 
off from the impact of globalisation. Increasing globalisation (in the sense of trade 
liberalisation and opening up of markets) is either deemed to be beneficial to 
developing country economies or to be detrimental to them. Usually, the impact of 
globalisation is discussed in terms of the integration of developing country markets 
into those of the industrialised centres of the global economy – that is, North 
America, European Union, and Japan. Consequently the discussion hinges on the 
question of who benefits from opening up developing country markets to these Triad 
economies (and vice versa). 
However, there are two problems with the way these discussions are framed. Firstly, 
they tend to assume a dichotomous world of ‘north’ (meaning industrialised) versus 
‘south’ (meaning developing). But this ignores the globalising impact of other 
rapidly industrialising economies in the South – principally China (including its 
supply chain hinterland in South East Asia) and India, both of which we term the 
Asian Drivers – on the rest of the developing world (Kaplinsky, 2005). Secondly, the 
discussion operates on the assumption that the impacts of globalisation are either 
positive or negative. In other words, there is an implicit assumption of a uni-
dimensional world with uni-dimensional impacts. 
Our analysis, however, proceeds from radically different assumptions. This paper 
attempts to take up both of these issues by viewing globalisation as consisting of 
multi-dimensional relationships between economies in both the developing and the 
developed worlds. The prism through which we view these relationships is the 
impact of the Asian Drivers on the most troubled area of the developing world, sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), in terms of their triangular relationship to the industrialised 
economies. Secondly, the paper takes an approach which assumes a multi-
dimensionality of impacts and global relationships. 
In assessing the impact of the Asian Drivers (or indeed any single economy) on SSA 
(or indeed any other region or economy), it is important to distinguish between two 
dimensions of effects. The first of these is the competitive-complementary 
dimension: There is a synergistic fit between the trading economies with win-win 
elements predominating, or is the relationship one of competition, a win-lose 
outcome? The second and more complex dimension is that between direct and 
indirect effects. Direct effects are easy to assess, arising from the bilateral 
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relationship between the two economies, for example, direct trade links between the 
Asian Drivers and other economies. Indirect impacts are more complex to assess, 
arising in third-country economies, for example, the impact which the Asian Drivers 
have on prices and market shares in third-country markets. A second classificatory 
taxonomy is that distinguishing different vectors of impacts, here we can identify the 
following major channels: trade links; flows of finance; links in production 
(including via FDI); institutions of governance; and migration. 
Figure 1 provides a taxonomical overview of these different dimensions and vectors 
of impacts and helps to situate our analysis of the portents for African 
industrialisation arising from the global expansion of Asian Driver economies in 
general and China, in particular. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to a limited 
terrain-the trade and production vector – through a case study of SSA’s clothing and 
textiles sector. In the conclusion, we assess which of these effects have the largest 
amplitude. 
Figure 2.1:  A Taxonomical Overview of Dimensions and Vectors of Asian Driver Impacts 
on other Regions and Economies 
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The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 is focused on the clothing and textiles 
sector. The reasons for this choice are obvious. First, it is the largest sector of SSA 
manufacturing exports, a major beneficiary of the US AGOA programme, hence 
encompassing the north-south dimension. Second, the quotas, which were the 
significant determinants of global production patterns, were removed at the close of 
December 2004, with the ending of the Multi Fibre Arrangement. Quota removal 
was widely believed to favour China and other Asian producers at the cost of other 
low-wage economies in general and SSA in particular. Furthermore, the removal 
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caused the closure the triangular relationship by encompassing the south-south 
dimension. Section 3 considers the wider impact of this sectoral case-study and 
assesses the implications for future industrial growth in SSA. 
MFA Quota Removal and SSA’s Clothing and Textiles Sector 
In 2004, a US International Trade Commission (ITC) enquiry into competitiveness in 
the global textiles and clothing industry provided a comprehensive overview of 
emerging trends, based in part, on a series of country case-studies conducted by 
industry experts. It concluded that China is ‘expected to become the “supplier of 
choice” for most U.S. importers (the large apparel companies and retailers) because 
of its ability to make almost any type of textile and apparel product, at any quality 
level, at a competitive price’. The ITC concluded that, China’s low unit labour costs 
were due to a combination of low wages and high productivity. In terms of quality, it 
is ‘considered by industry [to be] among the best in making most garments and 
made-up textile articles at any quality or price level’ (USITC, 2004: xi and xiii). 
Lead times were also relatively low. 
If accurate, this represents a major challenge for SSA clothing and textile exporters. 
One indicator of the sector’s regional importance is that, although clothing and 
textiles exports declined between 2003 (the peak year) and 2004, they still accounted 
for 4.7 percent of the total SSA merchandise exports, and 18.7 percent of total SSA 
manufactured exports in 2004 (WTO, 2005). (Most of these exports, 4.1 percent and 
16.4 percent respectively, were clothing). SSA clothing and textile exports are 
heavily concentrated in a few economies, and their strategic significance in some of 
the economies is very important, with major implications for growth and poverty 
reduction. For example, in Lesotho, clothing and textiles accounted for ninety-nine 
percent of exports and fifty percent of GDP in 2002 while in Kenya in 2003, 
employment in the export processing zone export-oriented clothing enterprises, 
accounted for the equivalent of nearly twenty percent of all formal sector 
manufacturing employment outside of the EPZs (Kaplinsky, 2004). 
The Global Clothing and Textiles Sector 
China is substantially the world’s largest clothing exporter, increasing the value of its 
clothing exports by 540 percent from $9.7 billion in 1990, to $62.0 billion in 2004 
(Table 1). In 1990, China accounted for only nine percent of the world’s  
total clothing exports, but by 2004, its share had increased to twenty-four percent.  If   
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Table 2.1: World Trade in Clothing by Top Ten Countries (US$ million) 
                                                         Exports Clothing 1990-2004 
% change 
% world total 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1990 2004 
China 1,625 2,450 9,669 24,049 36,071 36,650 41,302 52,061 61,856 540 9 24 
Hong Kong 4,976 6,718 15,406 21,297 24,214 23,446 22,343 23,152 25,097 63 14 10 
Italy 4,584 5,320 11,839 14,424 13,384 14,220 14,643 16,191 17,925 51 11 7 
Germany 2,882  7,882 7,530 7,320 7,444 8,338 9,749 11,221 42 7 4 
Turkey 131 1,208 3,331 6,119 6,533 6,661 8,057 9,937 11,193 236 3 4 
France 2,294 1,935 4,671 5,659 5,414 5,469 5,882 6,935 7,865 68 4 3 
Mexico 2  587 2,731 8,631 8,012 7,751 7,343 7,197 1126 1 3 
India 673 930 2,530 4,110 6,179 5,484 6,037 6,459 6,620 162 2 3 
Belgium     3,941 4,206 4,649 5,353 6,235  0 2 
United States 1,263 785 2,565 6,651 8,629 7,012 6,032 5,537 5,059 97 2 2 
World 40,590  108,129 158,353 197,498 194,490 202,310 225,940 258,097 139 100 100 
Imports Clothing 
United States 6,943 16,202 26,977 41,367 67,115 66,391 66,731 71,277 75,731 181 24 28 
Germany 8,326  20,411 24,550 20,183 19,330 19,647 22,219 24,076 18 18 9 
Japan 1,537 2,012 8,737 18,758 19,709 19,186 17,602 19,485 21,687 148 8 8 
UK 2,858 2,694 6,961 8,002 12,995 13,169 14,657 16,551 19,245 176 6 7 
Hong Kong 695 1,671 6,913 12,654 16,008 16,098 15,640 15,946 17,129 148 6 6 
France 2,637 2,707 8,381 10,639 11,412 11,769 12,402 14,771 16,791 100 7 6 
Italy 797 779 2,580 4,703 6,139 6,697 7,576 9,342 11,130 331 2 4 
Spain 152 121 1,649 2,492 3,847 4,279 4,965 6,559 7,732 369 1 3 
Belgium     4,828 5,013 5,272 6,249 7,156 0 0 3 
Netherlands 2,875 2,045 4,768 5,132 5,371 5,220 5,250 5,943 6,644 39 4 2 
World 42,271 50,822 112,236 162,871 207,093 203,820 211,765 236,035 269,473 140 100 100 
 
Source: Morris: Morris, Barnes and Eselar (2007) 
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Hong Kong, with ten percent of the world total is included, China effectively accounted for one third of 
the world clothing exports. China is also the world’s largest exporter of textiles products, with seventeen 
percent of global textile exports. Its textile exports increased from $7.2 billion in 1990, to $33.4 billion in 
2004 (362 percent), while its share of the world total more than doubled. Hong Kong and Italy each 
accounted for approximately eight percent of total textile exports, exporting $14.2 billion and $15.3 
billion respectively in 2004. China holds the greatest share of US imports (seventeen percent), with 
imports more than doubling since 1997, to reach $10,997 billion in 2003. 
SSA is only a small participant on this global stage. Its share of the global textile exports was only 2.6 
percent in 2004, and 3.7 percent for clothing (WTO, 2005). Most of these clothing and textile exports are 
destined for the USA, the largest SSA clothing and textile exporters are Lesotho, Madagascar, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Swaziland and South Africa. 
Preferential Trading Regimes and AGOA 
This structure of the global clothing and textiles sector reflects three major factors. The first is the 
concentration of global buying power in the industrialised countries (Gereffi and Memedovic 2003; 
Kaplinsky, 2005). The significance of this buyer concentration is their requirement for large volumes (and 
of course low prices). This has made it difficult for small scale suppliers to meet the requirements of large 
global buyers and this has advantaged countries, such as China, with large volume plants and trans-
national companies (often based in Hong Kong and Taiwan), who have a competitive advantage in 
organising large-scale production runs. 
The second major explanation for the structure of global production has been costs and efficiency. 
Although the clothing industry has become increasingly characterised by the requirement for shorter lead-
times, greater inter- and intra seasonal variety and tighter logistics (ITC, 2004; Kaplinsky, 2005), cost has 
been king in this industry. The intensity of the competition in these areas has been reflected in cost 
pressures and as Figure 2 shows, indicates, since the mid-1990s, there has been a secular downtrend in the 
global price of clothing (as reflected in the unit price of clothing imports). 
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Figure 2.2: US Import Prices for Clothing and Textiles, 1983-2002 ($/sqm equivalent) 
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Source: Manchester Trade Team (2005), from Textile Outlook International 
 
The third and the most important determinant of the global production structure has been the protective 
regime, which has determined the pool of countries who can reliably serve these large scale global buyers 
with low-cost and quality-assured product. Three protective regimes have been important, particularly in 
explaining SSA’s role in this global industry. It is important to note here that the US protective regime is 
most important to the SSA clothing and textiles industry since the overwhelming share of exports 
(particularly for Kenya, Lesotho, and Swaziland) is destined for the US market. Table 2.2 provides the 
data for key SSA, Eastern and Southern African clothing exporters; it excludes Mauritius, which is a 
major exporter to the EU. 
Historically, the most important preferential trade regime has been the multifibre Arrangement (MFA) 
(formally superseded by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in 1994, but still largely referred to as 
the MFA). For the last quarter of the twentieth century, the MFA regulated much of global trade and 
production in this sector, ratifying countries’ rights to impose quotas on textiles and clothing imports. 
This quota-based preferential trade access meant that production spread to an ever-increasing number of 
countries. This was largely because firms in quota-full economies organised garment production in under-
utilised quota producer countries. Thus, during the 1990s, a rapid process of third party organising and 
supply sourcing functions spread throughout the developing world to provide access to established 
markets. Hong Kong garment producers opened factories in Mauritius and elsewhere, and Korean and 
Taiwanese producers spread their operations to the Caribbean and SSA. In turn, as they matured in their 
operations and established their own footholds, Mauritian garment producers also spread their operations 
to Madagascar.  
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Table 2.2: Share of US in Exports of Key SSA Clothing Exporters 
Supplier* Year Exports ($ ‘000): 
  World USA US share% 
Kenya 2000 51,527 46,701 90.6 
  2001 74,094 68,967 93.1 
  2002 139,607 135,180 96.8 
  2003 208,476 201,749 96.8 
  2004 305,448 295,520 96.7 
Lesotho 2000 154,192 146,364 94.9 
  2001 236,968 223,549 94.3 
  2002 347,957 342,432 98.4 
  2003 427,504 418,995 98.0 
  2004 494,155 481,787 97.5 
Madagascar 2000 610,683 115,377 18.9 
  2001 686,695 188,102 27.4 
  2002 237,440 96,706 40.7 
  2003 363,023 211,742 58.3 
  2004 559,501 345,728 61.8 
Swaziland 2000 37,712 33,356 88.4 
  2001 56,518 50,340 89.1 
  2002 102,219 95,352 93.3 
  2003 153,054 149,683 97.8 
  2004 190,537 188,467 98.9 
South Africa 2000 453,153 150,313 33.2 
  2001 456,433 183,713 40.2 
  2002 347,239 193,376 55.7 
  2003 415,233 248,532 59.9 
  2004 252,453 149,402 59.2 
* Mauritius is a major SSA exporter but is excluded from this table as it is not part of this study. 
Source: UNSD COMTRADE database, accessed via World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) on 15 December 
2005; Country and sectoral data calculated on the basis of US imports. 
 
In more recent years, large Asian producers, especially in Hong Kong and Taiwan, developed the capacity 
to mobilise and coordinate full-package manufacture (that is, all the manufacturing stages) in the global 
textile and clothing value chain, leading to what Gereffi (1999) termed ‘triangular production networks’. 
In other words, production in one country (usually least developed) was organised and coordinated by 
firms in another (mostly middle-income) country, with products produced sold on to final buyers in yet a 
third (usually industrialised) economy. 
Following a five-year phase-down, the MFA came to an end on 31 December 2004, and with it, all quotas 
on textiles and clothing trade between member states of the WTO ended. The final step of quota removal 
on the 1 January 2005 came as a “big bang” - 86.5 percent of US quotas and 73.3 percent of EU quotas 
were involved (Williams et al, 2002: 580). However, the removal of quotas did not mean a level playing 
field since global trade in clothing and textiles is still regulated by tariffs. In the case of the US, in 2001 
the average weighted tariff for clothing and textiles was 15.5 percent, but they ranged from around 
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thirteen to seventeen percent for cotton products and from twenty-five to thirty-five percent for synthetic 
products.1 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into USA law on 18 May 2000. The aim 
of the Act is to assist SSA, using trade as a means of generating revenue, investment and employment. 
The largest manufacturing sector beneficiary of AGOA has been the clothing and textiles sector; this is 
because AGOA extends the GSP preferences offered to low-income economies to clothing and textiles. 
AGOA incorporated different rules of origin compared to the GSP. It built on procedures which had been 
established early in the 1990s, in relation to the Caribbean Basin Initiative, allowing for the use of US-
origin inputs or regional inputs in the calculation of minimum levels of value added (thirty-five percent). 
Nevertheless, despite these concessions, few SSA economies were able to meet these rules of origin in the 
clothing and textiles sector. Thus, in a further key amendment, AGOA-qualifying countries which were 
also classified under the UN’s “least developed category” (that is, per capita incomes of less than $1,500 
in 1998) were also subject to a further amendment to GSP rules of origin. That is, until September 2004 
(subsequently amended to September 2007 and then to 2012), they could source their material and 
accessory inputs from non-AGOA and non-US bases suppliers (up to a restricted share of US clothing 
imports), including from China and other Asian economies. In other words, they were freed from the 
minimum value added requirement. 
In 2004, the six  largest exporters of clothing and textiles to the US under the AGOA scheme were 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Kenya, Mauritius, Swaziland and South Africa (Table 2.3). The critical issue is the 
relationship between total exports of clothing and textiles and those which were AGOA-rules qualifying 
(compare Tables 2.2 and 2.3). In 2004, excluding Mauritius and South Africa, more than ninety percent of 
SSA clothing and textiles exports to the US has been via AGOA’s preferential trade access. The share of 
AGOA exports in all exports grew rapidly between 2001, and 2004 (particularly for Swaziland and 
Kenya); this reflects two general tendencies. First, new investments (including plant expansion) were 
made, directly targeting AGOA exports to the US. And second, in some cases, pre-existing plants 
exporting to the US were brought under the AGOA umbrella. The impact that this clothing- and-textiles 
based industrialisation process has had on creating wage employment and reducing poverty in these poor 
SSA countries has been huge (see table 2.3). 
Table 2.3: AGOA Clothing Exports to US, 2001 - 2004 ($m, and % share of all clothing exports to US) 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 $m % $m % $m % $m % 
Lesotho 129.2 60.1 317.7 98.9 372.6 94.9 447.6 98.2 
Madagascar 92.1 51.8 75.4 84.4 186.3 94.9 314.5 97.3 
Kenya 51.7 80.0 121.3 96.6 176.2 93.9 271.5 97.9 
Mauritius 38.9 16.3 106.5 41.8 135.0 50.2 147.8 65.3 
Swaziland 8.2 17.1 73.7 82.7 126.9 90.2 175.6 98.3 
South Africa 30.4 17.4 85 46.9 126.6 54.5 114.7 81.2 
Source: For 2001 and 2002, Gibbon, 2003; For 2003 and 2004, http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ and www.tralac.org 
(Accessed March-October 2005) 
SSA in the Post-Quota Era - Five Key Exporting Economies 
                                                 
1
  Ad valorem tarrifs only (UNCTAD, 2003:15). There are two explanations for the higher tariffs on synthetic products despite 
the fact that this is the area of speciality for the US clothing and textile industry. First, the US industry saw cheap synthetics as 
a competitor to its cotton products. Second, synthetics were incorporated into the MFA at a later stage than cotton products, 
and the US industry, which had been scared by competition in cotton products, saw this as an opportunity to dampen potential 
future competition in synthetics (We are grateful to Peter Minor for these observations). 
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Predictions 
The “big bang” of January 2005 was a very significant event. It allowed countries, such as China, which 
had formerly been limited in accessing major markets by quotas to compete on price. Those countries 
such as the AGOA-qualifying economies and other groupings incorporated in preferential trading 
arrangements (for example, the Caribbean Basin Initiative economies and Mexico through NAFTA) 
continue to benefit from a remission of duties. China prepared for quota removal with investments to 
improve efficiency. In 2002, it accounted for seventy-five percent of global shuttle-less loom purchases 
and in the process of automation, displaced one million workers (USITC, 2004). This was reflected at the 
firm-level. For example, between 1998 and 2004, the Shanghai Shenda Group fired 50,000 workers, out 
of a total labour force of 60,000, and closed down twenty factories. In the same period, sales rose from 
$170m to $415m (Hilligas, 2004: 13). 
It was not just China which geared itself for this change but, more importantly, the global TNCs, which 
had developed to serve the needs of the large scale buyers in the major clothing importing countries. 
Many of these clothing and textiles TNCs have their bases in Asia. In 2003, there were 20,000 FDI 
investments in China in clothing and textiles and FDI inflows into this sector comprised ten percent of 
overall incoming FDI into China. More than one third of China’s clothing and textile exports in 2004 
were directly exported by TNCs (Appelbaum, 2005) but, perhaps more importantly, externally-based 
global intermediary buyers (Gereffi’s (1999) “triangular manufacturers”) coordinated much of the 
clothing and textiles exported directly by Chinese-owned companies. 
In anticipation of quota removal, there were a large number of attempts to predict the outcome (Kaplinsky 
and Morris, 2006: Annex 1). With regard to SSA, most studies predicted a severe, if not catastrophic 
outcome, not only with regard to the indirect competitive impacts in third country markets, but also in 
regard to the poverty impact (Business for Social Responsibility, 2005). Figure 2.3, based on the widely-
cited 2004 ITC Report, suggested that Asia, in general and China, in particular, would be the major 
beneficiaries of quota removal, and that NAFTA and SSA would be the major casualties. 
Figure 2.3: USITC Prediction of Vulnerability of Clothing Exports Following Quota Removal (% of clothing 
exports) 
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Source: Data derived from USITC (2004). 
 
Outcomes 
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In assessing the outcome of the first year of quota removal, we focus on aggregate AGOA exports, as well 
as the major exporters (with the exception of Mauritius), namely: Lesotho, Swaziland, Kenya, 
Madagascar, and South Africa. We concentrate on the clothing sector since, with the exception of South 
Africa, there are negligible direct exports of textiles to the US. In each case, we compare export volumes, 
unit prices and market shares with China. (See Kaplinsky and Morris, 2006 for more detailed analysis and 
for a comparison with India and other East-Asian economies). 
As can be seen from Table 2.4 and Figures 2.4 and 2.5, the major trends were that: 
 
 
Table 2.4: Change in Value of Exports and Unit Prices in Clothing Exports to the US,  
2004-2005 (%), Weighted Average of Top Ten Products for Individual Countries* 
  Value (% change) Unit prices (% change) 
SSA China SSA China 
AGOA -17 58 -0.9 -45.9 
Lesotho -17 112 -3.2 -46.2 
Madagascar -14 76 -9.5 -44.0 
S. Africa -45 65 3.0 -33.0 
Swaziland -10 91 -2.7 -51.9 
Kenya -3 97 -1.9 -44.8 
*In each case, China’s exports are in the same ten-digit product groupings as are those of the individual countries. 
Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data, accessed on 10 January 2006 
 
• The value of African clothing exports to the US dropped by seventeen percent in the first 
year after quota removal. Lesotho experienced a similar fall in export value, followed by 
Madagascar (fourteen percent fall) and Swaziland (ten percent decline). The two outliers 
were Kenya, where exports declined by only three percent, and South Africa, whose exports 
collapsed by forty-five percent. 
• By contrast, the value of China’s exports to the US of the same products grew very rapidly, 
by fifty-eight percent by comparison with all AGOA exports and to a larger extent by 
comparison with the ten major traded products of individual countries. 2 
• Unit prices, on average, remained reasonably stable in key product groupings for individual 
countries, with Madagascar experiencing the sharpest decline (ten percent). By comparison, 
in the same product groupings, the unit value of Chinese exports almost halved. (However, it 
is not clear to what extent this was due to a reduction in the unit prices of individual 
products, or China’s entry into producing lower-end products within each of these ten-digit 
product classifications). 
• In general, AGOA economies performed less badly in their major exported items than they 
did in the aggregate, suggesting a process of specialisation. However, it is a cause for alarm 
that China’s export growth in these sectors and the rate of price decline was faster than for its 
overall exports, suggesting  potentially heightened competition for SSA products in the 
future. 
                                                 
2
 In each case in Tabel 2.4, we compare Chinese export values and unit values in the twenty largest ten-digit product groupings 
for AGOA and each SSA country’s exports to the US. 
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Figure 2.4: AGOA country share of US market in 10-digit product categories in which country 
exports were concentrated in 2005 
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Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data, accessed on 10 January 2006. 
Source: Industry and Government interviews. 
 
• The share of SSA exporters in the US clothing and textiles imports grew between 2001 and 
2004, reflecting the combination of quota-access and preferential AGOA trading 
arrangements. However, the removal of MFA quotas set back this advance, and African 
exporters experienced a significant fall in their share of the US market after quota removal. 
By contrast, China’s share in each of these major product markets grew significantly. 
• South Africa reflects a possible and negative face of SSA’s future. Unable to access 
imported materials through the derogation on market-entry for least-developed countries, 
South Africa uniquely experienced a very large fall (a halving in fact) of its exports to the 
US. 
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Figure 2.5: China’s Share of US Market in 10-digit Product Categories in Which AGOA Country Exports Were 
Concentrated in 2005 
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Source: Calculated from http://dataweb.usitc.gov data, accessed on 10 January 2006 
Source: Industry and Government interviews 
 
A major consequence of this decline in exports from the AGOA region was the impact on employment 
and overall economic activity. At its peak, in 2002, Lesotho’s clothing exports to the US accounted for 
virtually all manufactured exports, and contributed fifty percent of GDP. In Kenya, in 2003, clothing 
enterprises accounted for the equivalent of nearly twenty percent of all formal sectors manufacturing 
employment. Table 2.5 demonstrates the impact of quota removal on employment in 2005. In Swaziland, 
the most severly affected cournty, overall employment more than halved; Lesotho employment fell by 
twenty-nine percent. Even in Kenya, where clothing exports had fallen by only three percent in 2005, 
employment declined by nearly ten percent. The South African case is much worse than appears from 
Table 2.5. There had been a severe employment loss in the industry in the years preceding the removal of 
quotas. Moreover, as we have seen, unlike the other AGOA economies in this Table, South Africa had not 
been able to build its AGOA clothing exports on the back of imported fabrics. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5: Employment Decline in the Clothing Sector, 2004-2005 
Clothing sector Employment 
 2004 2005 % decline 
Kenya 34,614 31,745 9.3 
Lesotho 50,217 35,678 28.9 
S Africa 97,958 83,081 15.2 
Swaziland 32,000 14,000 56.2 
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Source: Industry and Government Interviews 
Buyer Intentions 
The broad conclusion from this trade analysis is that, although there has been considerable pricing 
pressure and employment loss, and although some sectors (knitwear) and some economies (South Africa 
and Lesotho) were hit worse than others, SSA AGOA exports were surprisingly resilient. This outcome, 
at least in the first year after quota removal, contradicts some of the bolder predictions of the post-quota 
future of SSA’s clothing and textile sector. 
In searching for an explanation for this, we polled the major US buyers. The purchasing process is 
triggered by the final retailers in the US who, often using in-house design offices, define the product lines 
and price points which they require for the coming season. In a very limited number of cases, retailers 
(such as Walmart) and brand-sellers (such as The Gap) make direct contact with manufacturers. But in 
most cases they pass over their requirements to US-based primary sourcing agents. These primary 
sourcing agents, in turn, either contact secondary sourcing agents in producing countries, or more 
commonly, and especially when there are very large orders, make contact with Asian-based 
manufacturing companies (the “triangular manufacturers”). It is these manufacturing houses who 
ultimately decide where different products are to be sourced from and most often provide clothing 
manufacturers not only with the designs, but also the fabrics which they use. However, in most cases, the 
US principals and sourcing agents are aware of the source of these garments and influence the decision 
made by their Asian intermediary buyers and manufacturing houses. 
Our interviews were exclusively with the US-based retail and sourcing agents, shaded grey in Figures 2.4 
and 2.5. Our decision was based on the premise that SSA clothing exports were overwhelmingly destined 
for the US final market (Tables 2.2 and 2.3 above), and we assumed that it was here that the key sourcing 
decisions were to be made. 
The views and perspectives of twenty US buyers were obtained through a telephone survey carried out in 
the summer of 2005. These companies are large, multi-store operations with substantive global sourcing 
activities in clothing and other consumer goods. The participants came from four key market segments: 
branded specialty retail (nine responses); manufacturers (branded and private label, eight responses); 
department stores (two responses); and mass merchants (one response). The share of their total sourcing 
portfolio coming from SSA, ranges from one to five percent with the exception of one small company 
(turnover of $30m in 2004), which obtained thirty percent of its product from SSA. 
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Figure 2.6: Triangular Manufacturing and SSA Clothing Exports to the USA 
 
Source: Own construct 
 
Amongst the issues we explored with buyers (see Kaplinsky and Morris (2006) for a discussion of wider 
issues) was whether quota-removal was likely to lead them to retreat from SSA, and whether this differed 
between the short-term (the coming one-to-two years) and the medium-term (the coming three-to-five 
years). 
 A key response (Table 2.6) from sixteen of the nineteen respondents was that they were largely sourcing 
from SSA in order to compete on price. Their inability to access products from quota-constrained 
economies such as China was not the major reason they were importing from SSA.3 Second and as a 
consequence of SSA’s current price competitiveness, approximately half of the buyers thought that there 
would be no change over the coming two years, and four of them said that, if anything, they were likely to 
increase purchases from SSA. However, there is clearly an expectation that SSA will suffer from 
diminishing competitiveness, since when asked about intentions over the medium-term, almost half of the 
buyers (nine of the nineteen) thought that they were likely to decrease imports from SSA over the three-
to-five year time horizon. 
Table 2.6: How Important have MFA Quotas been in your Decision to Source from SSA? (Number of buyers) 
Questions Decrease Unchanged Increase Total 
‘How are you likely to change 3 16 0 19 
                                                 
3
  However, to some extent SSA’s price competitiveness had its origins in the quota-system. Given an absolute limit in the 
number of items which could be exported, Chinese producers generally tended to concentrate on high-price, high margin 
products, leaving SSA concentrated at the bottomend of the price range. 
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agents, retail chains 
US-based primary sourcing 
agents 
Asia-based primary and 
secondary sourcing agents 
Asia-based 
manufacturing head 
offices 
Asia-based material 
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African garment manufacturers 
 Dotted lines represent weak linkages; Interviews conducted with buyers in shaded-boxes 
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SSA sourcing as a result of quota 
elimination?’ 
‘What are your plans to source 
from SSA in the next 1-2 years?’ 
4 11 4 19 
‘What are your plans to source 
from SSA in the next 3-5 years?’ 
9 8 2 19 
 Source: Own survey 
 
If quotas were not a major reason why buyers currently source from SSA, then how important are AGOA 
preferences to SSA’s competitiveness? The response (Figure 2.7) was that this was clearly critical, with 
more than half of the buyers (ten out of nineteen) reporting that it was ‘very important’. However, even 
more important was the view that it was the derogation on the rules of origin allowing AGOA economies 
to source fabrics from Asia which made it possible for these economies to compete (fifteen of the 
nineteen buyers characterised this as being ‘very important’). 
Again, reflecting the fact that quotas have not been the basis for sourcing from SSA in recent years, few 
of the buyers thought that existing or likely future “China safeguards” would make much difference.4 A 
majority of buyers also thought that consumer pressures on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) were a 
significant factor in sourcing from SSA, reflecting the growing commercial need of buyers to show 
awareness of the poverty-impact of their sourcing decisions. 
                                                 
4
  The Chinese accession agreement to the WTO, allow for safeguard tariffs and quaotas to be applied solely against Chinese 
textiles and clothing, even when imports exert only a slight a dverse impact on the domestic industry. In June 2005, the EU 
and China reached an agreement that limited ten categories of Chinese textiles exports to the EU to between 8 and 12.5 
percent growth above a specified base period for the next three years. In December 2005, the US and Chinese trade 
representatives agreed to a three-year agreement reducing US imports of Chinese textile and apparel products in all or parts of 
thirty-four sensitive categories. 
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Figure 2.7: Buyer Perceptions of the Relative Importance of AGOA Preferences, China Safeguards and Corporate 
Social Responsibility in the Decision to Source from SSA (1=not important, 5=very important) 
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Source: Own survey 
 
To close the triangle, we also interviewed enterprises in the five SSA countries. One of the more 
surprising outcomes of these plant-level visits was the pessimism of the firms, at least insofar as this is 
reflected in responses from enterprises in Kenya, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa.  
As Figure 2.8 indicates, the US buyers have much more positive intentions of staying in the region than 
the firms perceive. Eighty percent of them expect either to have unchanged purchasing requirements or 
increased requirements from SSA over the coming one-to-two years, and almost half believe that this will 
be the case even over the three-to-five year time horizon. By contrast, producers in all countries (and 
especially Lesotho) think it much more likely that sourcing requirements will deteriorate. 
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Figure 2.8: Producer Perceptions of Future Sourcing from SSA 
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Source: Own survey 
 
Finally, we asked the US buyers to rank the performance of firms in SSA compared to their Chinese and 
Indian counterparts (Figure 2.9). Chinese firm capabilities were clearly observed to be more developed in 
every respect, followed by Indian suppliers and then, some way behind, SSA suppliers. The performance 
gap was smallest for labour relations and greatest for delivery time and flexibility, product development 
capabilities, technology levels and quality. With the exception of delivery time, these are all areas where 
SSA firms can improve and this is an issue which we address in the policy conclusions. 
Figure 2.9: The Performance of SSA China and India Clothing Firms on Operational Factors (1=very poor 
performance; 5=excellent performance) 
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Source: Company interviews 
Can an Export-Oriented SSA Clothing and Textile Industry Survive in the Post-
Quota Era? 
As demonstrated, and contrary to the expectations of many, the removal of quotas has not led to a 
collapse of AGOA clothing and textile exports. Indeed, in some cases, they have even increased. We 
should however put one important caveat on this conclusion. One key informant asserted that the reason 
why export values seem to have declined less than employment has been the illegal transhipments from 
China, with clothing either being brought directly into AGOA countries and then re-exported, or the 
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paperwork suggesting that this was the case. (This is akin to transfer-pricing, which has long bedevilled 
international trade statistics and undermined government tax revenues). It is notable that the ten percent 
fall in Swazi exports to the US is much lower than the loss in total employment (fifty-six percent in the 
same period). We are unable to judge whether these assertions – apparently currently the subject of 
investigation – are accurate and the analysis below does not take them into account. 
It is widely believed that by limiting China’s export surge, the introduction of China safeguards in the US 
(and in the EU) midway through 2005, may lead to a further strengthening of SSA clothing and textile 
exports. However, the impact of the imposition of China’s safeguards is generally misinterpreted. 
Although designed to ‘protect domestic industry’ from Chinese competition, it is not only China whose 
exports were kept out of major importing markets by quotas. Other low-cost and high-quality Asian 
producers are similarly able to compete effectively in the major markets, and they, rather than SSA or 
domestic industries in the US and the EU, are likely to be the primary medium term beneficiaries of 
China safeguards. Firms interviewed reported some resurgence of orders to SSA in the immediate 
aftermath of China safeguards, while in the immediate context of safeguards being imposed, the existing 
relationships between US buyers and SSA producers have clearly had a role to play when alternative 
sourcing was necessary. The key however lies in the medium term, when buyers have more time to make 
and set in place new sourcing decisions. 
Although, historically, quotas were important in the establishment of the export-oriented clothing and 
textiles sector in SSA, the key to understanding the relatively robust performance of SSA AGOA 
exporters lies in the realm of costs. This, as we have seen from earlier analysis, is the single most 
important driver for the buyers. Within this, the degree of competitive advantage held by AGOA 
exporters arises from their duty preferences. And, here, US nominal tariffs significantly underestimate the 
degree of preference which AGOA producers are actually accorded. This can be seen by taking the 
example of two different products exported by Swaziland producers (Table 2.7). The first product is 
cotton denim jeans, where nominal duty preference is 16.6 percent, and the second is synthetic women’s 
underwear, where the nominal duty preference is higher, at 28.2 percent. 
In effect, these tariffs are a form of cost-subsidy to exporting firms. However, the rates of effective 
subsidy on these products are in fact much higher than these nominal rates, due to the derogation which 
Swaziland (and all other AGOA producers bar Mauritius and South Africa) producers have in using 
imported fabrics. That is, the nominal duty applies to the whole value of the product, but for AGOA 
producers using the fabrics derogation, much of the value of their output is made up of imported material. 
Moreover, not only do the synthetic products’ manufacturers gain from higher duties, but because in 
general cotton products are more complex to manufacture, the proportion of (generally imported) cotton 
fabric is in fact lower than in the case of imported synthetic material products. Hence, in the case of 
cotton products (such as denim), the effective rate of subsidy provided by this protective regime is 27.7 
percent (rather than 16.6 percent), and in the case of synthetic products (such as underwear) it is 83.9 
percent (rather than 28.2 percent). 
Table 2.7: Value Added and Effective Rates of Subsidy in Cotton Denim Jeans and Synthetic Women's 
Undergarments in Two Swaziland Clothing Factories 
 Denim jeans (%) Synthetic women’s 
undergarments (%) 
Labour costs 45 30 
Fabric and other imported inputs 40 66 
Utilities 3 1 
Distribution 2 2 
Other (agent fee, transport, etc )  10 1 
Total 100 100 
Duty preference 16.6 28.2 
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Effective rate of subsidy 27.7 83.9 
Source: Company interviews 
 
An indication of the influence of the higher rate of effective subsidy on AGOA clothing and textile 
exports can be seen in relation to the value of exports of different products. There is a significant positive 
correlation between tariff rates and the value of exports with regard to the export of 120 products (the top 
twenty products exported by each of the five countries plus the top five AGOA exported products, Table 
2.8). In other words, the higher the tariff preferences, the more likely export values will rise. However, 
this may only confer a temporary advantage. These same sectors are being targeted by Chinese and other 
Asian producers. This is evidenced by a significant negative correlation between tariff preference levels 
and unit prices. In other words, it is precisely those highly protected sectors which are under the most 
severe forms of price pressure, and where falling market shares are most likely to be experienced by 
AGOA exporters. 
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Table 2.8: Correlation Between Degree of Tarrif Preference, the Values of Exports  
and the Unit Price of Exports to the US: 120 Sectorsa 
 Correlation coefficient Degree of significanceb 
Value of exports 0.189 0.05 
Unit price -0.146 0.10 
Source: Own survey 
(a) Top 20 products for each of AGOA, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland and Madagascar. 
(b) Pearson product moment correlation coefficient two tailed test. 
 
The fabric derogation is critical 
It follows from this discussion on the impact of tariffs that, without the derogation from the AGOA rules 
of origin, which allow the least developed qualifying SSA economies to import their fabrics from outside 
of the region (or the US), little of the clothing and textile industries in the region would survive. As can 
be seen from Figure 2.10, with the exception of South Africa (which also affects the AGOA total), almost 
all fabric in AGOA clothing exports has been imported (although the new denim mill opened in Lesotho 
in 2004, will reduce this somewhat in the future).5 South Africa’s experience represents the dark side of 
AGOA clothing producers’ future when and if the fabric derogation is repealed. Its inability to import 
fabrics, on top of an appreciated exchange rate, lies at the source of the virtual halving of its AGOA 
exports in 2005 compared to 2004. In fact, the trajectory of the South African industry – severe 
difficulties in exporting clothing made from natural fibres, a focus on the domestic market and moving 
into high technology textile niches (see below) – may represent one option facing other SSA producers. 
But unlike South Africa, with its long tradition of industrial production and a developed textile sector, 
these options may not be possible for other SSA producers. 
                                                 
5
  Most of the firms operating in the region source their material inputs from East Asia in general, and predominantly from 
China. This is an ironic side effect of the derogation on the rules of entry, in that, given the importance of fabrics in 
production (especially in the case of synthetics), the primary beneficiary of the AGOA scheme are the Asian fabric suppliers! 
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Figure 2.10: Share of Non-AGOA and Non-US Cloth in AGOA Exports to US, 2004-2005 
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Source: Calculated from US Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA). 
 
Although of primary significance, the combination of tariff protection and the derogation on the rules of 
origin is not the only factor influencing the competitive costs of SSA producers. In other respects, some 
SSA countries are also penalised. Although Kenya has wage costs which are comparable to Asia, this is 
not the case for South Africa (Table 2.9). Wages are only one component of unit labour costs. The other 
components are the degree of automation involved, the skills possessed by the labour force and the 
effectiveness of management. A detailed investigation of productivity in Lesotho observed low levels of 
skill and efficiency (Salm et al, 2002). Middle management was particularly weak, as it was largely made 
up of Chinese workers with shop-floor experience but little management know-how and largely unable to 
communicate with the Sesotho speaking labour force. They concluded that ‘operator productivity within 
the industry was generally low. This is principally due to deficient recruitment policies, inadequately 
trained operators, poor labour  relations, poor supervisory management, communication difficulties and 
cross-cultural misunderstanding’ (Salm et al, 2002: 51). In a separate conclusion, there is the perception 
that the industrial engineering function is not carried out in a focused manner that might achieve 
significant improvements in productivity. Poor labour relations are part of this.  A detailed survey of 
worker attitudes found that 51.3 percent of workers felt “very negative” towards their employers while a 
further 14.3 percent felt “quite negative”. Only one percent felt “very positive”.  
Fifty-four percent felt that their lives had not improved at all since joining their factories, and a further 
thirty-seven percent that it had improved “only a little”. There was remarkable consensus across the 
different focus groups; regardless of age, employment status or gender the participants expressed 
fundamentally the same views. The overwhelming majority see Asian investors (their factory managers) 
in an extremely negative light (Salm et al, 2002: Annex 3, 21). 
Table 2.9: Labour Costs in Selected Countries 2002: US$/hour 
 Textiles Industry Clothing Industry 
Bangladesh 0.25 0.39 
Sri Lanka 0.4 0.48 
China 0.4-0.69 0.68-0.88 
India 0.57 0.38 
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Kenya 0.62 0.38 
Egypt 1.01 0.77 
Mauritius 1.33 1.25 
South Africa 2.17 1.38 
Mexico 2.3 2.45 
Taiwan 7.15 Na 
Madagascar na 0.33 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2004) 
 
The Manchester Trade Team (2005) compared costs along a range of factors for COMESA and China and 
India for an equivalent product to show the barriers faced by SSA clothing exporters. They found that: 
• Export finance costs in Kenya (thirteen percent per annum) and Madagascar (eighteen 
percent) were much higher than in China (5.5 percent) and India (10.5 percent) 
• Material costs were much higher in Kenya ($3/sq ft) and Madagascar ($4/sq. ft) than in 
China ($1.50/sq ft) and in India ($2.50/sq.ft) 
• Transport costs to the US East Coast were lower for Kenya and Madagascar than for China 
($0.29 versus $0.33 per jean) but were lowest for India ($0.23 per jean). 
• The costs of machinery and power were rather similar, but labour productivity with 
equivalent machines was significantly higher in China (twenty-five pieces per day) than in 
India (twenty-one per day), Kenya (eighteen per day) and Madagascar (sixteen per day). 
Clothing manufacturers depend heavily on access to reliable infrastructure. Here SSA producers are 
disadvantaged compared to their Asian counterparts. In some countries, water supplies, critical to 
successful production, are intermittent. One of the clothing firms in Lesotho had to close thirteen out of 
twenty-three lines in 2004 due to high water cost, inadequate supply and low quality available, while 
another Lesotho firm observed poor water supplies along with power outages, as a handicap to 
production.  Swazi firms also reported water shortages and power outages. In Kenya, production is often 
confined to EPZs precisely because of the failure of infrastructure supplies in the wider economy, 
electricity costs are more than three times those in South Africa (Ikiara and Ndirangu, 2003b). The 
comparison with China is stark, with Kenyan firms facing frequent outages, and losing significant 
production due to power shortages, despite having to invest in generators, new businesses have also to 
wait very long periods for connection to the grid (Table 2.10). 
Table 2.10: Electricity Supplies in Kenya and China 
 Kenya China 
Frequency  of power outages (No of times last year) 33.1 n.a. 
Per cent  of production lost due to power outages 9.3 1.8 
Have own generator (%) 70.0 17 
No. of days to obtain an electricity connection 65.6 18.2 
Source: World Bank, 2003 
 
The weakness of the transport system, associated with bureaucratic hold-ups also leads to considerable 
delays and makes it almost impossible for SSA producers to produce items for higher-margins rapid-
response markets. Unlike their Asian competitors, SSA producers have to wait around thirty days to 
obtain their imported inputs and a further twenty-eight to forty days to deliver product to final markets 
(Table 2.11). However effective production might be, perhaps halving throughput time to around fifteen 
days, it will not be possible to make up for these structural weaknesses in the economy. 
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Table 2.11: Determinants of Lead Time - Kenya, Lesotho and Swaziland 
Delivery type Kenya   Lesotho Swaziland 
Delivery of fabric from Asia 
(Taiwan or China) 
30 days 30 days 
 
30 days 
From port to factory 7 days (Nairobi) 3 days 3-10 days 
Production lead-time 30 days 25 - 30 days 25-30 days 
Factory gate to port 3 days 3 day 2 days 
Port to U.S.A. Port (New 
York) 
40 days 
Mombasa to New 
York 
28 days 
Durban to New 
York 
28 days 
Durban to New 
York 
Total delivery time 110 days  90 – 100 days  90-100 days 
Source: Company interviews 
 
Finally, those economies linked to the South African rand faced a further disadvantage. The Chinese 
remnimbi has been pegged to the US dollar for some years, although in mid-2005 there was a mild 
revaluation of 3.5 percent. Similarly, the Kenyan shilling was pegged to the US dollar and neither of these 
economies faced adverse exchange rate movements in their sales to the US (or indeed to the EU, since the 
euro appreciated in relation to the dollar). The major casualties amongst SSA AGOA economies were the 
three Southern African economies and Madagascar. As Figure 2.11 shows, between early 2002 and mid 
2005, the rand appreciated by more than fifty percent against the dollar, with an adverse impact on South 
Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland. 
Figure 2.11: Exchange Rate against the US$ - China, Kenya and South Africa 
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Source: UN (https://pengva1.unjspf.org) last accessed 3 January 2005 
 
With the exception of South Africa, the impact of currency depreciation was less severe than it seems at 
first sight. This is because around forty percent of value added in the case of natural fibre products, and 
two-thirds of value added in the case of synthetic products, comprised imported material and, whilst 
currency appreciation has a downside on the exports; it has an upside in reducing the costs of imports. 
This is another factor which may act to promote the shift from natural to synthetic fibre products. South 
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Africa is the exception to this, since together with Mauritius, it has no access to imported fabrics for 
AGOA exports and the appreciation of the Rand has made South African fabric more expensive. 
Despite these handicaps, the evidence seems to suggest that SSA clothing and textile exporters who are 
able to draw on trade preferences are still largely able to compete with the best in the world. They also do 
this with the evidence of significant productivity improvement over the past year, in that export values 
and volumes have held up much better than employment in Kenya, Lesotho and Swaziland. Moreover, as 
various industry analysts have pointed out, there is considerable scope for further improvements in 
efficiency (Manchester Trade Team, 2005; Salm et al, 2002). But to achieve this requires tailored and 
effective government support and, more importantly, comprehensive firm-level restructuring in the 
industry. 
Enhanced capacities of innovation management – the ability to scan the environment, to develop 
appropriate strategies, and then to implement these strategies – this is key to a successful response. 
Here, the response of South African producers may provide some pointers to other SSA clothing 
manufacturers. Confronted by an appreciating currency and an inability to source low-cost Asian fabric, 
South African manufacturers have chosen from six options: exit from the market; concentration on the 
local market; upgrading production capabilities seeking to attain world class manufacturing operational 
performance; using local fabrics; focusing on higher value added fashion garments as well as using man-
made synthetic fabric; and upgrading into specialised niches. The second of these options-the local 
market – is not without its difficulties. In one example, a producer of underwear faced a fifty percent 
increase in imports in the first six months of 2005, predominantly from China, with a halving of its 
exports. Hence, the industry is focusing on a rapid-response capability to help its retailers to slim overall 
inventories and to respond flexibly to changing market tastes. This strategy currently goes hand in hand 
with attempts (driven by the domestic retailers) to synergise the local value chain and achieve systemic 
efficiency. Closely allied to it is the third option of developing localised clusters to upgrade operational 
capabilities through learning networks. These are however still in their infancy and there is no consensus 
as to whether they will achieve the same success levels as similar initiatives in the South African 
automotive sector. 
The fourth option – deeper investments in fabric production – confronts the need for nervous investors to 
commit large sums of money to what are perceived to be risky ventures. Our interviews with textile 
producers in South Africa did not identify major dynamism in this sector. This affects not just the 
viability of the South African industry, but the future of other SSA economies which might cope with the 
phased removal of the fabric derogation in 2007 by sourcing material from South Africa. Its current 
textile capabilities are not adequate to meet these needs and numerous firms in the region who have tried 
to source from South Africa, have found the mills to be unresponsive and high cost, with long lead times 
and poor quality. The attempts to synergise the domestic value chain may well turn the textile sector 
around and overcome these inefficiencies. 
The fifth option takes advantage of AGOA’s higher tariff rates for producing clothing using synthetic 
fabric. Firms in both Swaziland and South Africa have adopted this route and tried to diversify from 
natural fibre products. However, despite the higher protection levels this strategy accords, its usage has 
been limited primarily to Swaziland. Finally the sixth option-upgrading into specialised niches - has been 
more successfully pursued by some South African firms. One large firm began manufacturing suit linings 
in the 1960s, moving into industrial fabrics in the early 1970s. The industrial fabric division was 
developed to also cover the parachute sector, and specialised and high-tech industrial products now 
comprise seventy percent of output, and are targeted to reach ninety percent of sales by 2007. 
Significantly, this high-tech textile producer is capital intensive in nature, with labour costs representing 
only fourteen percent of costs (compared to forty-five percent in the natural fibres clothing sector). 
Although this transition is beyond the reach of producers in other least developed SSA markets, the 
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strategy of focusing on long-term upgrading and diversification provides an important lesson for SSA 
textile and clothing producers. 
Even if technologically sophisticated upgrading is difficult, there may nevertheless be scope for 
diversification to take advantage of emerging opportunities. For example, like South Africa, the Mauritian 
clothing industry was unable to take advantage of the derogation on rules of entry. It therefore targeted an 
AGOA exemption for yarns which are in short supply in the US, and used this to import Chinese and 
Italian yarn to manufacture high quality shirts for the US market. Thus, comparing 2004 with 2003, the 
exports dutiable exports declined by forty-three percent and duty-free exports to the US increased by 
seventeen percent (Appelbaum, 2005). 
From Clothing and Textiles to Industry: What Impact Will the Asian Drivers Have 
on SSA’s Industrialisation? 
We began by stressing the importance of a multi-dimensional approach when analysing the impact of the 
Asian Drivers. This meant viewing the globalisation effects through the prism of the triangular 
relationships of South-South and South-North, which we posed as direct/indirect and 
complementary/competitive impacts. Producing a methodological taxonomy to grasp this complexity 
does not, however, mean that it has an analytic validity. This can only be verified by testing empirically 
and we have done so by an empirical analysis of the clothing and textile industry in Sub Saharan Africa. It 
would seem that the soundness of this complex analytical tool has been vindicated. 
What is the empirical conclusion from the analysis? We begin by relating the performance of SSA’s 
clothing and textile sector in the post-quota era to the taxonomic overview presented in Figure 1 at the 
head of this paper. Here we distinguished between two dimensions of effects: the 
competitive/complementary dimension, and the direct/indirect one. Of the five possible vectors of 
transmission, it is in the trade and production realms that we can observe Asian Driver impacts on SSA’s 
clothing and textiles industry. 
Figure 2.12 summarises what we have found. Essentially, the complementary impacts are to be found in 
fabric-sourcing from Asia by SSA-based firms and by FDI from Asia. Most of AGOA’s clothing exports 
originate from Asian-owned firms, which were initially attracted to SSA by quotas and now remain due to 
the high rates of effective subsidy provided by AGOA. Both of these complementary impacts are a 
consequence of direct bilateral impacts between SSA economies, and China and other Asian economies. 
The competitive impacts to SSA arising from the expansion of the Asian Driver economies are 
predominantly indirect in nature. They are primarily experienced in the very intense pressures on prices 
and market shares in the US (and the EU), and a diversion of FDI from SSA to Asia. However, there are 
also indirect effects in the displacement of production by indigenous firms. South Africa represents the 
one case where the competitive impacts are of a direct nature. This is due to the rapid penetration of the 
substantial domestic market by Chinese clothing and textile products. 
Although no accurate weighting can be given to these different impacts, it is clear that by far the most 
important one is the indirect impact on prices and market shares in global markets (shaded grey in Figure 
2.12). 
Figure 2.12: Asian Driver Impact on the SSA Clothing and Textile Sectors (Shading denotes the important impact) 
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What is the wider significance of these findings? Here we can point to six important issues. The first 
concerns the negative impact of globalisation on SSA. Where buyers have multiple sources of supply, 
SSA is unable to compete effectively in global markets. In a world where there is a level playing field, it 
will have little global presence as an exporter. In the case of clothing, SSA has been unable to fully hold 
on to its already tenuous position, with effective rates of subsidy provided by a preferential trade regime 
of between twenty-eight and eighty-four percent, and has seen an aggregate decline in clothing exports of 
seventeen percent, despite a sharp rise in US imports of clothing in 2005. Our complementary study of 
SSA’s furniture industry, where protective subsidies are less than thirteen percent reveals that, without 
these subsidies, SSA producers are being squeezed out by Chinese, Indonesian and Vietnamese 
competition (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2006). South Africa remains the only significant exporter of wooden 
furniture, and its exports have fallen in value. Total SSA furniture exports are around one percent of 
global trade, having fallen from 1.5 percent in 2000. So, our first conclusion is that SSA requires a non-
level playing field in global trade, significantly tilted in its favour and primarily tilted against its major 
competitors who are now based in Asia, rather than in the EU or North America. 
Second, domestic manufacturers in a range of industries are suffering badly from import competition, 
particularly in consumer goods markets, from China. In addition to the clothing and furniture sectors 
(discussed above), similar trends can be found in industries such as footwear in Ethiopia (Egziabher et al, 
2006). 
The third is the terms of trade effect and the emergence of classic “Dutch Disease” effects, but with a 
regional sting in the tail. One of the primary causes of South Africa’s resurgent economic growth has 
been a boom in (hard) commodity exports. This has been a major factor in driving the appreciation of the 
exchange rate (see Figure 2.11 above). This exchange rate appreciation has not only made it difficult for 
South African manufactured exports (not just clothing and textiles, but also wooden furniture and other 
low-tech and labour–intensive products), but also for the export of manufactured goods from regional 
economies such as Lesotho and Swaziland, whose currencies are linked to the Rand, but who are not large 
exporters of commodities themselves. 
Fourth, the clothing and furniture industries are widely recognised as being the stepping stones for 
industrial development. Our findings suggest that these first steps are being blocked by competition from 
the Asian Drivers in general, and China in particular. This being the case, the implication of our study is 
not so much about the present trajectory of SSA industrial development, but more so about its future 
trajectory. Unless it is believed that the Asian Driver economies will soon run into capacity constraints 
(perhaps labour) and be forced to raise their costs, or that their overall success will surface in significant 
upward realignments of their currencies, it is difficult to see a future for SSA industrialisation in a global 
economy. It may be that the changing terms of trade will mean that industrial development will be a 
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relatively less attractive development option in the short- to medium-run (Kaplinsky, 2006), but this is a 
separate issue. The reality is that commodity-based sectors (particularly mineral-based commodities) have 
few linkages and provide little scope for positive external economies. 
Fifth, the welfare effect of importing cheaper clothing on the poor  and working class of SSA cannot be 
discounted. If the South African case is to be taken seriously, the greatest impact, it would seem from 
preliminary research, is on significantly reducing the unit prices of children’s and infants clothing. 
Although in the process this has had a deleterious impact on the clothing industry in these product items, 
the general welfare impact, by allowing greater disposable income for household expenditure, would 
seem to have been large. Although unemployment in these sectors may have been increased by the impact 
of the Asian Drivers, essentially the social wage for the rest of the society is also significantly reduced. 
Finally, in this chapter we have considered in depth a single industry in a single continent. But our 
conclusions are not only relevant for other industries in SSA, but also for other regions in the world. 
There are compelling reasons to believe that the prospects facing large parts of Latin American and 
Caribbean industry are not dissimilar to those confronting SSA (Jenkins and Peters, 2006; Kaplinsky, 
2005). This being the case, we may yet again find ourselves in familiar territory, raising questions about 
the attractiveness of deepening globalisation for many countries. 
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